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SOCIAL MEDIA ACCOUNTABILITY 
FOR TERRORIST PROPAGANDA 
Alexander Tsesis* 
 
Terrorist organizations have found social media websites to be invaluable 
for disseminating ideology, recruiting terrorists, and planning operations.  
National and international leaders have repeatedly pointed out the dangers 
terrorists pose to ordinary people and state institutions.  In the United States, 
the federal Communications Decency Act’s § 230 provides social networking 
websites with immunity against civil law suits.  Litigants have therefore been 
unsuccessful in obtaining redress against internet companies who host or 
disseminate third-party terrorist content.  This Article demonstrates that 
§ 230 does not bar private parties from recovery if they can prove that a 
social media company had received complaints about specific webpages, 
videos, posts, articles, IP addresses, or accounts of foreign terrorist 
organizations; the company’s failure to remove the material; a terrorist’s 
subsequent viewing of or interacting with the material on the website; and 
that terrorist’s acting upon the propaganda to harm the plaintiff. 
This Article argues that irrespective of civil immunity, the First 
Amendment does not limit Congress’s authority to impose criminal liability 
on those content intermediaries who have been notified that their websites 
are hosting third-party foreign terrorist incitement, recruitment, or 
instruction.  Neither the First Amendment nor the Communications Decency 
Act prevents this form of federal criminal prosecution.  A social media 
company can be prosecuted for material support of terrorism if it is 
knowingly providing a platform to organizations or individuals who advocate 
the commission of terrorist acts.  Mechanisms will also need to be created 
that can enable administrators to take emergency measures, while 
simultaneously preserving the due process rights of internet intermediaries 
to challenge orders to immediately block, temporarily remove, or 
permanently destroy data. 
 
 
 
*  Raymond & Mary Simon Chair in Constitutional Law and Professor of Law, Loyola 
University School of Law, Chicago.  Thanks are due to Jack Balkin, Richard Bierschbach, 
Danielle Citron, and Martin Redish.  This Article was prepared for the Fordham Law Review 
symposium entitled Terrorist Incitement on the Internet held at Fordham University School 
of Law.  For an overview of the symposium, see Alexander Tsesis, Foreword:  Terrorist 
Incitement on the Internet, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 367 (2017). 
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INTRODUCTION 
Audiences worldwide rely on web services to access a wide variety of 
content.  Internet information channels transmit everything from historical 
documents, music videos, and political blogs to defamatory statements, 
bomb-making instructions, torture videos, and child abuse recordings.  
Terrorist groups have found the internet to be a godsend, offering an effective 
platform for developing social bonds, radicalizing recruits, and increasing 
membership.1  Coordinated terrorist missions can be planned from afar, as 
recently occurred in India, where engineer Mohammed Ibrahim Yazdani and 
his terrorist cohorts received and unsuccessfully conspired to act on 
directives to attack technical infrastructures.2  His Islamic State handlers sent 
digital instructions to him from Syria and orchestrated an elaborate plot for 
obtaining weapons and explosive chemicals.3  Even before he began actively 
participating in the terror plot, Yazdani was won over by “the Islamic State’s 
online propaganda.”4 
Parties who seek legal redress for injuries perpetrated by individuals 
indoctrinated through internet advocacy often encounter legal barriers.  This 
is especially conspicuous in lawsuits filed against web services hosting 
objectionable content, such as terrorist incitement and related information.  
Internet service providers (ISPs), online service providers, search engines, 
and social networking websites commonly invoke § 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act (CDA) to assert immunity from civil 
lawsuits.5  District and appellate courts have consistently ruled in favor of 
 
 1. HOMELAND SECURITY INSTITUTE, THE INTERNET AS A TERRORIST TOOL FOR 
RECRUITMENT AND RADICALIZATION OF YOUTH 6 (2009), http://barakaconsult.com/uploads/ 
reports%20on%20internet_radicalization.pdf [https://perma.cc/2K65-62QQ]. 
 2. Rukmini Callimachi, Not ‘Lone Wolves’ After All:  How ISIS Guides World’s Terror 
Plots from Afar, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/04/world/asia/ 
isis-messaging-app-terror-plot.html [https://perma.cc/CA6E-S5LW]. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. See Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (finding that a 
social networking website like Facebook is immune under the CDA); Getachew v. Google, 
Inc., 491 F. App’x 923, 925–26 (10th Cir. 2012) (holding that an internet search engine is 
immune from litigation alleging harm to reputation resulting from information discovered 
through an internet search); Black v. Google, Inc., 457 F. App’x 622, 623 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(finding that an ISP is immune from defamation litigation); Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 
791 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that the CDA bars “plaintiffs from holding ISPs legally 
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defendants relying on this strategy.  Litigants have unsuccessfully sought 
redress from internet companies for hosting and disseminating third-party 
terrorist and defamatory contents.6 
Congress intended § 230 immunity to preserve robust communications and 
to place responsibility on information intermediaries to take down harmful 
communications.7  The underlying aims arose from First Amendment 
concerns and bureaucratic considerations; however, the approach has become 
a strategic arrow in the quivers of web companies seeking to limit liability 
from knowingly allowing foreign terrorist organizations to exploit digital 
platforms to recruit and threaten.  Digital information companies have seized 
on a law created to advance robust internet communications to shield their 
businesses from liability for refusing to eliminate all threatening videos and 
messages. 
The policy of immunizing digital social media has some clear benefits:  
facilitating the spread of ideas, democratic values, creativity, culture, art, 
friendship, travel, news, and much more.  Moreover, it is arguably in keeping 
with the U.S. Supreme Court’s aversion to content-based restrictions on 
expression,8 especially preventing parties from being subject to suits for third 
parties’ fraudulent or illegal postings about which the intermediary remained 
unaware.9  However, certain heinous content on the internet, especially 
terrorist propaganda, raises compelling public concerns.  Just as online 
information intermediaries are not immune from criminal liability, neither 
should they enjoy immunity from civil lawsuits.  The United Nations Office 
on Drugs and Crime has made clear the international import of having the 
United States take legislative initiative by passing a statute to combat terrorist 
propaganda:  “It would be extremely helpful to other countries if the United 
States could find a solution to its limited ability to furnish judicial 
cooperation concerning foreign incitement offenses resulting from its 
jurisprudence concerning freedom of speech and expression.”10  Even as 
litigants remain hampered in their abilities to obtain civil redress for harms, 
the Justice Department can file criminal charges against social media 
companies that knowingly host foreign terrorist organizations.11 
 
responsible for information that third parties created and developed”); Whitney Info. Network, 
Inc. v. Verio, Inc., No. 2:04CV462FTM29SPC, 2006 WL 66724, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 11, 
2006) (determining that a web hosting service was immune from liability under the 
Communications Decency Act because it hosted an allegedly offending website but did not 
create its contents). 
 6. See, e.g., Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1031 (9th Cir.  2003) (“[Section] 230 limits 
immunity to information ‘provided by another information content provider.’  An ‘information 
content provider’ is defined by the statute to mean ‘any person or entity that is responsible, in 
whole or in part, for the creation or development of information provided through the internet 
or any other interactive computer service.’” (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012)). 
 7. David S. Ardia, Free Speech Savior or Shield for Scoundrels:  An Empirical Study of 
Intermediary Immunity Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 43 LOY. L.A. 
L. REV. 373, 410 (2010); Dawn C. Nunziato, The Death of the Public Forum in Cyberspace, 
20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1115, 1142 (2005). 
 8. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015). 
 9. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 153–54 (1959). 
 10. U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, DIGEST OF TERRORIST CASES 118 (2010). 
 11. See infra Part III.B. 
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This Article argues that irrespective of civil immunity, the First 
Amendment does not limit Congress’s authority to impose criminal liability 
on those content intermediaries who have been notified that their websites 
are hosting third-party foreign terrorist incitement, recruitment, or 
instruction.  Neither the First Amendment nor the CDA prevents this form of 
federal criminal prosecution.  Gaining clarity about the constitutional issues 
involved is consequential because, to date, the government has failed to bring 
suit against internet information companies such as Twitter, Facebook, and 
Google for material support of terrorists. 
Part I of this Article details the uses of social media sites to disseminate 
terrorist materials.  Part II elaborates the relevant First Amendment 
limitations pertinent to the regulation of intermediaries who carry and 
publicly make available terrorist materials on their websites.  Part III first 
discusses CDA immunity from civil litigation.  It then explains how federal 
criminal law can and should hold digital intermediaries responsible for 
hosting terrorist-sponsored, terrorist-initiated, or terrorist-controlled digital 
materials.  The refusal to either notify law enforcement authorities or to take 
down the offending materials poses national and local threats to safety and 
security. 
I.  TERRORIST FORUMS ON SOCIAL MEDIA 
Over the last ten years, social media websites have become critical tools 
for the dissemination of terrorist propaganda.  A number of terrorists, 
including Omar Mateen, who attacked the Pulse gay nightclub in Orlando, 
Florida, murdering forty-nine people and injuring fifty-three others, were 
radicalized in part through digital materials readily available on the 
internet.12  The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Hamas, and a variety 
of other terrorist organizations use Facebook to recruit and to propagandize.13  
Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, and Minbar al-Tawhid wal-Jihad are among the groups 
who have found Twitter to be tremendously helpful for spreading messages 
of political violence and group hatred.14  YouTube, another major social 
media intermediary on which third parties rely to circulate all manner of 
instructional, entertainment, and private video content, is also a hub of 
terrorist indoctrination and teaching.15  These companies make radical clips 
digitally available throughout the world, enabling terrorist leaders to affect 
the conduct of millions of viewers.  Terrorist associations have found Twitter 
 
 12. Ed Pilkington & Dan Roberts, FBI and Obama Confirm Omar Mateen Was 
Radicalized on the Internet, GUARDIAN (June 14, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2016/jun/13/pulse-nightclub-attack-shooter-radicalized-internet-orlando 
[https://perma.cc/7MLL-Q3W6]. 
 13. See Abigail Tracy, Facebook’s $1 Billion Terrorism Lawsuit Points to a Huge 
Problem for Silicon Valley, VANITY FAIR (July 12, 2016), http://www.vanityfair.com/news/ 
2016/07/facebook-billion-dollar-terrorism-lawsuit [http://perma.cc/W9W3-DSTW]; Dan 
Warburton, British ISIS Leader “Using Facebook to Recruit Terrorists to Target the UK,” 
MIRROR (Mar. 12, 2016), http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/british-isis-leader-using-
facebook-7545645 [https://perma.cc/6YWD-9Q3D]. 
 14. GABRIEL WEIMANN, TERRORISM IN CYBERSPACE:  THE NEXT GENERATION 139 (2015). 
 15. Id. at 141–46. 
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and YouTube to be invaluable forums for amplifying and disseminating 
violent propaganda and information.  In addition, national security experts 
have warned that those platforms can even be manipulated to orchestrate real-
time operations, which empowers handlers to direct attacks either from 
distant shores or in close proximity.16 
Many internet information companies post written policies against using 
their platforms to spread violence and hatred, but their staffs are often 
intransigent, even upon receipt of credible information about overt violent 
instigation on their websites.17  While social media companies remove some 
terrorist content, they often deny watchdog requests, even after being alerted 
that posts overtly advocate the use of violence to achieve a social or political 
end.18  Advocacy groups have periodically found it difficult or impossible to 
convince social media companies to remove online terrorist 
communications.19  Indeed, in many cases, companies like Facebook have 
allowed degrading statements to be accessed on their platforms despite their 
own standards for community decency. 
Facebook pledges to remove “graphic images when they are shared for 
sadistic pleasure or to celebrate or glorify violence.”20  Although its 
administrators received several requests to take down a graphic page called 
“Stab Israelis,” Facebook refused to abide by its written policy against 
posting statements favoring brutal attacks.21  Not only was the title of that 
website an explicit instigation to violence, but the images on it clearly 
depicted background images with a Palestinian flag and a superimposed male 
hand holding a large butcher knife.22  Likewise, Facebook found that a page 
called “Death to Zionst [sic] baby killer Israeli Jews” did not violate its 
community standard against hate speech.23  Nor were these isolated failures 
to respond. 
 
 16. Steven Muslin, U.S. Army Warns of Twittering Terrorists, CNET (Oct. 28, 2008), 
https://www.cnet.com/news/u-s-army-warns-of-twittering-terrorists/ 
[https://perma.cc/7VNF-LHBV]. 
 17. See infra note 21. 
 18. See infra note 22. 
 19. Scott Shane, Internet Firms Urged to Limit Work of Anwar al-Awlaki, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 18, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/19/us/politics/internet-firms-urged-to-
limit-work-of-anwar-al-awlaki.html [https://perma.cc/4Q9R-SQ4H]. 
 20. Community Standards:  Encouraging Respectful Behavior, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards#violence-and-graphic-content 
[https://perma.cc/2FRH-HQ9T] (last visited Oct. 16, 2017). 
 21. Yitzhak Benhorin, 20,000 Israelis Sue Facebook, YNETNEWS.COM (Oct. 27, 2015), 
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4716980,00.html [https://perma.cc/8W3Y-
GREV].  While Facebook initially refused to eliminate the “Stab Israelis” page, it eventually 
complied after an Israeli newspaper printed information about the company’s intransigence.  
JNS.org, Facebook Removes ‘Stab Israelis’ Page Following Article in Hebrew Press, 
ALGEMEINER (Oct. 14, 2015, 2:46 PM), http://www.algemeiner.com/2015/10/14/facebook-
removes-stab-israelis-page-following-article-in-hebrew-press/ [https://perma.cc/L8AS-
SERV]. 
 22. See JNS.org, supra note 21. 
 23. “Death to Zionist Baby Killer Israeli Jews” Is OK on Facebook, BEFORE IT’S NEWS 
(July 28, 2014, 10:03 AM), http://beforeitsnews.com/opinion-conservative/2014/07/death-to-
zionist-baby-killer-israeli-jews-is-ok-on-facebook-2886068.html [https://perma.cc/T6JZ-
YJ9X]. 
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Facebook likewise refused to censor anti-Muslim hate websites.  Despite 
receiving reports of at least fifty offending pages, some instigating violence, 
the company refused to take down many inciteful sites.24  The latter 
Facebook pages incite against Muslims through the uses of stereotyping, 
dehumanizing statements, and advocacy for their exclusion from civil 
society.25  Other groups who have long been the targets of hatred, such as the 
Roma and Sinti, also face violent online calls for their geographic 
displacement.26  The list of targeted groups could be extended to many other 
identifiable communities. 
Especially violent language is found on many anti-Semitic forums.  For 
example, a Facebook page contained a graphic painting showing a man 
walking menacingly, shoulders hunched, down the street with a butcher knife 
in his hand in the direction of two Chasidic Jews at a bus stop.27  These pages 
appeared during a spate of terrorist stabbings in Israel.28  They were not 
merely parodies or oppositional statements but among a plethora of Facebook 
pages that praised and urged anti-Semitic violence.  “There is nothing greater 
than a knife penetrating the heads of the Jews,” read another page.29  In a 
separate post, a teacher at one of the United Nations Relief and Works 
Agency (UNRWA) schools posted a call to “hit Tel Aviv . . . Screw the Jews 
hahaha,” to the side of a digital photo that depicted a man shooting a rocket 
launcher with explosives detonating near him.30  Another UNRWA teacher’s 
Facebook page asserted, “Good news to the Zionist settlers, choose your 
preferred method of death, and we will provide it.  Run over, knife, screw, 
axe, hammer, choke, hang, skinning, cutting.”31  Facebook’s failure to abide 
by its contractual terms of decency puts into serious doubt whether the 
current regimen of relying on corporate self-policing suffices.  Regulations 
are needed that would require Facebook actively to review its databases for 
the presence of terrorist speech, to remove it even in the absence of third-
party complaints, and to monitor ISP addresses from which hateful or 
inciteful materials had been sent.  Criminal liability, as this Article argues in 
 
 24. How Facebook Responded to Anti-Muslim Hate, ONLINE HATE PREVENTION INST. 
(Dec. 8, 2014), http://ohpi.org.au/how-facebook-responded-to-anti-muslim-hate/ 
[https://perma.cc/GEH2-4AZH]. 
 25. Andre Oboler, The Normalisation of Islamophobia Through Social Media:  Facebook, 
in ISLAMOPHOBIA IN CYBERSPACE:  HATE CRIMES GO VIRAL 41, 45 (Imran Awan ed., 2016). 
 26. Anti-Roma Violence Highlights Need for Better Online Hate Speech Laws, NASC 
(Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.nascireland.org/latest-news/anti-roma-violence-highlights-need-
better-online-hate-speech-laws/ [https://perma.cc/BS29-CRZH]. 
 27. Social Media as a Platform for Palestinian Incitement—Praise for Stabbing Attackers, 
Threats of Further Attacks, MIDDLE E. MEDIA RES. INST. (Oct. 14, 2015), 
https://www.memri.org/reports/social-media-platform-palestinian-incitement-praise-
stabbing-attackers-threats-further [https://perma.cc/4YSV-XZUY]. 
 28. Ben Wedeman, Israeli-Palestinian Violence:  What You Need to Know, CNN (Oct. 
15, 2015, 12:32 PM), http://edition.cnn.com/2015/10/14/middleeast/israel-palestinians-
violence-explainer/ [https://perma.cc/S2WV-FPWE]. 
 29. Lawrence J. Haas, Sowing the Seeds of More Mayhem, U.S. NEWS (Oct. 20, 2015, 
12:30 PM), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2015/10/20/western-
response-to-palestinian-violence-encourages-more-terror [https://perma.cc/R5S4-SBYL]. 
 30. UN WATCH, POISONING PALESTINIAN CHILDREN 13 (2017). 
 31. Id. at 79. 
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Part III, would be the most effective means of addressing the dissemination 
of extremist digital communications. 
The offending materials are not merely offensive and degrading.  Facebook 
has become an important conduit through which terrorists to communicate 
and inspire audiences.  One of the two spouses who committed mass 
terrorism in San Bernardino, Tashfeen Malik, announced her allegiance to 
ISIS through a Facebook post.32  Given the sophistication of Facebook 
algorithms, which are capable of producing almost immediate targeted 
advertisement to persons posting on its platform,33 it is conceivable that a 
refined algorithm can be designed to quickly identify posts supporting 
terrorism. 
Terrorist preaching on other sources is not at all subtle and is easily 
identifiable.  Terrorist videos are plentiful on YouTube.  A simple search of 
Anwar al-Awlaki’s name on the website yields over 70,000 hits.34  Al-
Awlaki, who was assassinated by the United States in Yemen, was a 
notorious propagandist with a vast following.35  Before Malik and her 
husband, Syed Farook, participated in the mass shooting at a community 
center, they had listened to hours of al-Awlaki’s inciteful lectures.36 
YouTube also hosts videos of Abubakar Shekau, the militant leader of the 
Boko Haram terrorist group that between 2013 and 2015 was responsible for 
about 5400 religiously and politically motivated attacks in northern 
Nigeria.37  Al-Awlaki’s and Shekau’s videos are a collage of indoctrination, 
degradation, propagandization, and recruitment.38  Requests that YouTube 
voluntarily remove al-Awlaki’s videos have enjoyed limited success.39  With 
 
 32. Richard A. Serrano, Tashfeen Malik Messaged Facebook Friends About Her Support 
for Jihad, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2015, 5:41 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-
ln-malik-facebook-messages-jihad-20151214-story.html [https://perma.cc/4SK3-E4AX]. 
 33. Targeting Audiences, FACEBOOK FOR DEVELOPERS, https://developers.facebook.com/ 
docs/marketing-api/audiences-api [https://perma.cc/PG79-34BQ] (last visited Oct. 16, 2017). 
 34. Search Results, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/results? 
search_query=anwar+al-awlaki [https://perma.cc/PV44-HT4X] (last visited Oct. 16, 2017). 
 35. Marc Ginsberg, Urgent Call to Action:  You Tube Must Cease Abetting Terrorism in 
the U.S., HUFFINGTON POST (June 21, 2016, 2:39 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/amb-
marc-ginsberg/urgent-call-to-action-you_b_10595574.html [https://perma.cc/N5QH-TV6D]. 
 36. Shane, supra note 19. 
 37. Jason Nichols, Boko Haram Is as Big a Threat as ISIS.  So Why Are We Ignoring It?, 
HILL (Jan. 18, 2017, 1:00 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/international-
affairs/314807-boko-haram-is-as-big-as-threat-as-isis-why-are-we [https://perma.cc/U2AF-
DNCR]. 
 38. Mark D. Wallace, Remove Terrorists from YouTube:  Column, USA TODAY (Jan. 25, 
2016, 7:33 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2016/01/25/remove-terrorists-
youtube-social-media-column/78939982/ [https://perma.cc/9XVA-HJBJ].  For examples of 
Boko Haram videos with English transcription see Samuel Lewis, Boko Haram Release 
Chilling Videos of Missing Nigerian Schoolgirls—with Subtitles, YOUTUBE (May 12, 2014) 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MmL2T9r0QbM [https://perma.cc/SH3G-KVCB]; 
splashnaijaNG, Scary Stuff!  Full Transcript of Shekau’s Recently Released Boko Haram 
Video, YOUTUBE (Nov. 1, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zf3SDizT6x8 
[https://perma.cc/2CPB-5U6C]. 
 39. See James Gordon Meek & Kenneth R. Bazinet, YouTube’s Got to Gag Jihad 
Mouthpiece Anwar al-Awlaki:  Rep. Anthony Weiner, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 24, 2010), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/youtube-gag-jihad-mouthpiece-anwar-al-
awlaki-rep-anthony-weiner-article-1.187619 [https://perma.cc/4WNN-9BYS]. 
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no legal consequences threatening its operations, YouTube has steadfastly 
refused requests to remove all videos of international terrorists from its 
searchable database, despite their highly inciteful and intentionally 
threatening contents. 
That social media company has also rebuffed customer takedown requests 
for the extremist videos of Anjem Choudary, who called on his followers to 
join ISIS and praised the martyrdom of the September 11 hijackers.40  Some 
videos are taken down for violating the community guidelines,41 but the 
company is selective and nontransparent about its decisions.  Even after 
Choudary reportedly influenced over 100 people to commit acts of terrorism 
and was sentenced to five-and-a-half years in jail,42 his followers have 
continued to upload and watch his sermons on YouTube.43  Twitter also 
allows Choudary to spread his ideas, where he has tens of thousands of 
followers, but British police requests to delete that account went 
unanswered.44 
Terrorist organizations have widespread presence on prominent social 
media websites.  Terrorists use digital platforms to spread ideology, recruit, 
and legitimize violent political schemes.  Information providers have 
indirectly contributed to the unprecedented spread of radical calls for 
ideological and religious murder, war, and enslavement.  Without regulatory 
intervention, web platforms are likely to continue aiding these organizations 
in enlisting new disciples. 
The threat terrorist organizations pose to stability, public safety, and 
national security is widespread and should be addressed by government 
initiatives.  The European Commission has warned, “[T]errorist groups have 
demonstrated advanced skills in the use of the internet and new 
 
 40. Vikram Dodd, Anjem Choudary Jailed for Five-and-a-Half Years for Urging Support 
of Isis, GUARDIAN (Sept. 6, 2016, 1:36 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/ 
sep/06/anjem-choudary-jailed-for-five-years-and-six-months-for-urging-support-of-isis 
[https://perma.cc/5W9P-SYXU].  For video examples of his teachings, see Liberalisten1995, 
Anjem Choudary Speaks Out [Big Interview], YOUTUBE (July 1, 2014), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PJENp68YBKY [https://perma.cc/JMU9-H6AS]; 
Y.O.Y., Anjem Choudary Muslim Hate Speech, YOUTUBE (Aug. 9, 2016), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RsUBk11q92U [https://perma.cc/WKJ9-YNFA]. 
 41. Emily Pennink, Anjem Choudary Verdict:  YouTube and Twitter Refused to Delete 
Radical Preacher’s Extremist Posts, Court Hears, INDEPENDENT (Aug. 16, 2016), 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/anjem-choudary-verdict-youtube-twitter-
facebook-isis-terrorism-posts-not-deleted-a7194041.html [https://perma.cc/73QZ-8ZWY]. 
 42. Michael Adebolajo, who participated in the murder of the soldier Lee Rigby, was one 
of those whom Choudary influenced to commit terrorism. Vikram Dodd & Jamie Grierson, 
Revealed:  How Anjem Choudary Influenced at Least 100 British Jihadis, GUARDIAN (Aug. 
16, 2016, 1:14 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/aug/16/revealed-how-
anjem-choudary-inspired-at-least-100-british-jihadis [https://perma.cc/6259-FMQR]. 
 43. Joseph Curtis, Outrage as Extremist Hate Videos Starring Hate Preacher Anjem 
Choudary’s Followers Are STILL on YouTube Despite His Conviction, DAILY MAIL (Aug. 20, 
2016, 11:17 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3750223/Outrage-extremist-hate-
videos-starring-hate-preacher-Anjem-Choudary-s-followers-available-online-despite-
jailing.html [https://perma.cc/6SF7-ZURS]. 
 44. Press Association, Twitter and YouTube Would Not Remove Anjem Choudary’s Posts, 
Court Told, GUARDIAN (Aug. 16, 2016, 12:33 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/media/ 
2016/aug/16/twitter-youtube-anjem-choudary-social-media [https://perma.cc/2EHB-XBAC]. 
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communication technologies to disseminate propaganda, interact with 
potential recruits, share knowledge, plan and coordinate operations.”45  
Corporate self-policing is a start, but, by itself, reliance on private actors is 
insufficient to deal with a problem of such widespread magnitude.  Social 
media companies’ initiatives have been insufficient to remove tens of 
thousands of posts, videos, accounts, and texts.  Mandatory schemes should 
be developed requiring digital information providers to transmit suspicious 
posts to a central cyberterror unit, which can examine the material and refer 
First Amendment questions to agency counsel or the attorney general’s 
office.46 
II.  FIRST AMENDMENT CONCERNS 
Statutes regulating social media responsibility for inciteful messages 
posted by third parties raise First Amendment concerns about how to 
maintain national security while safeguarding free expression.  Adjudication 
should balance government’s obligation to combat terrorism with the 
personal right to enjoy uncensored information.  The Supreme Court has 
found that under ordinary circumstances government may not impose 
absolute restrictions on the contents of speech.47 
This judicial finding has not, however, been understood as an absolute bar 
to regulation.  Some narrowly tailored censorship is appropriate, especially 
where there is the compelling public reason to punish intentionally seditious 
calls to engage in armed violence.48  The Court has in addition found speech 
that is obscene to be outside the purview of the First Amendment.  The test 
for obscenity is overtly content based, allowing the trier of fact to examine 
whether, “taken as a whole,” statements or pictorial depictions have “serious 
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”49  Words that are likely to illicit 
an “immediate breach of the peace,” such as a fight, are likewise 
unprotected.50  Whether a limitation on expression is constitutionally suspect 
must be assessed both by “the setting in which the speech occurs” and “on 
 
 45. European Commission Press Release, Implementing the European Agenda on 
Security—New Measures to Combat Terrorism and Illicit Trafficking of Firearms and Use of 
Explosives (Dec. 2, 2015), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-6219_en.htm 
[https://perma.cc/VW8S-PJ2K]. 
 46. This proposal is analogous to the requirement that social media companies report or 
provide means for users to report cyber terror to centralized law enforcement authorities. See 
Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014, c. 27, § 1 (UK), amended by Counter-
Terrorism and Security Act 2015, c. 6, § 21 (UK); Bertrand Liard & Alexis Tandeau, New 
French Act on Intelligence Services:  Impacts on Technical Operators, WHITE & CASE (Sept. 
11, 2015), http://www.whitecase.com/publications/article/new-french-act-intelligence-
services-impacts-technical-operators [https://perma.cc/B4MY-UX26]. 
 47. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (“Content-based regulations are 
presumptively invalid.”). 
 48. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 25–39 (2010); Dennis v. United 
States, 341 U.S. 494, 516–17 (1951) (plurality opinion). 
 49. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). 
 50. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942). 
614 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
exactly what the speaker had to say.”51  First Amendment doctrine is not 
rigid; rather, it evolves through case-by-case developments.  The specific 
words used and the context in which they are uttered are pertinent to First 
Amendment inquiry. 
The internet is an evolving platform.  It facilitates almost instant 
communications, but messages sent over it will rarely result in immediate 
breaches of the peace and, therefore, will ordinarily not involve fighting 
words.52  Messages that might be dangerous in the context of face-to-face 
conflicts would more rarely have an immediate pugilistic effect when they 
are transmitted on the internet.  That is not to say that the fighting-words 
doctrine is entirely irrelevant to cyberspace.  Leaders of a terrorist 
organization can, for instance, use Twitter to direct immediate mayhem, as 
they did during the Mumbai attacks of 2008.53  Terrorist propaganda often 
directs recipients to commit acts of violence at some unspecified time.54  
Moreover, insofar as some individuals may use social media to instigate 
immediate illegality, they and their accomplices would be personally 
culpable.  The social media intermediary, as Part III explains, would likely 
claim to be civilly immune from liability for the fighting words posted by 
third parties. 
A different barrier would confront litigants filing civil suits against social 
media companies, claiming to have suffered harms from allegedly 
threatening digital posts.  To recover for true threats, a plaintiff must prove 
the defendant’s culpability.55  Under this doctrine, computer intermediaries 
are not culpable for acting as instruments for third parties, even when the 
latter intended the material to be threatening.  Some websites and 
applications, however, are run by terrorist organizations and their minions, in 
which case the threat is directed by the web service.56 
 
 51. Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 66 (1976) (footnote omitted).  There 
are also essential ethical and social dimensions to the First Amendment that this Article only 
touches upon. See generally Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. 
L. REV. 1249 (1995); Alexander Tsesis, Free Speech Constitutionalism, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1015; Alexander Tsesis, Multifactoral Free Speech, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1017 (2016). 
 52. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 (holding that fighting words “by their very utterance 
inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace” and are not protected by the 
First Amendment (footnote omitted)). 
 53. Jeremy Kahn, Mumbai Terrorists Relied on New Technology for Attacks, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 8, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/09/world/asia/09mumbai.html 
[https://perma.cc/7DS9-SKK5]. 
 54. Eric Geller, France Blames Facebook and Twitter for Terrorism, DAILY DOT (Dec. 
11, 2015, 9:45 AM), https://www.dailydot.com/layer8/france-social-networks-terrorism/ 
[https://perma.cc/8S8X-YTHE] (quoting the French secretary of state for European affairs as 
saying, “[i]n recent years, the Internet has become the major channel for terrorists to organize 
and to incite violent attacks”); Alroy Menezes, Woman From Scotland Joined Islamic State to 
Become “Martyr,” INT’L BUS. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2014, 10:21 AM), http://www.ibtimes.com/aqsa 
-mahmood-scotland-joined-islamic-state-become-martyr-1680588 [https://perma.cc/TG3X-
FCBD] (reporting on a woman who allegedly used her Twitter account to encourage Muslims 
living in the West to perpetrate terrorist acts). 
 55. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 366–67 (2003). 
 56. For a discussion of how terror groups rely on apps and encrypted software to 
communicate, see Robert Graham, How Terrorists Use Encryption, CTC SENTINEL, June 
2016, at 20.  For further discussion see Sean Gallagher, ISIS Using Encrypted Apps for 
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Unlike the fighting-words and true-threats doctrines, the material support 
of terrorism statute57 offers an avenue of legal redress against internet 
information providers who refuse to take down terrorist content, especially 
when it leads to violence.  The remainder of this Part discusses the general 
parameters of the material support doctrine, and Part III applies that doctrine 
to social media information providers. 
In Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,58 the Supreme Court upheld a 
federal statute that prohibited persons and organizations from furnishing 
“material support or resources” to any group that the U.S. Department of 
State determined to be a foreign terrorist organization under the Immigration 
and Nationality Act.59  The statute contains a scienter element, criminalizing 
only “knowingly” aiding60 any group(s) practicing “premeditated, politically 
motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational 
groups or clandestine agents.”61  The case was initially brought by 
Humanitarian Law Project, an organization that sought to counsel the 
Kurdish Workers’ Party and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, both on 
the designated terror list, about how to use international law, engage in 
politics, and lobby international organizations.62   
The Court upheld the statute.  Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the 
majority, made clear that when a party’s statements are coordinated with a 
designated terrorist organization, the federal government has a compelling 
interest in public safety.63  At the same time, simple advocacy of even 
heinous political perspectives are protected against government intrusions.  
The law did not prohibit individuals from proclaiming affinity for the banned 
groups, from adopting their political views, or even from associating with 
them.64  The holding was in accord with erudite observations of Justices 
Robert Jackson and Arthur Goldberg that the Constitution is not a suicide 
pact.65 
The First Amendment does not protect persons who or organizations that 
make statements on the internet advocating political violence, nor should it 
 
Communications; Former Intel Officials Blame Snowden, ARS TECHNICA (Nov. 16, 2015, 
4:46PM), https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2015/11/isis-encrypted-
communications-with-paris-attackers-french-officials-say/ [https://perma.cc/C8EG-DESE]. 
 57. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2012). 
 58. 561 U.S. 1 (2010). 
 59. Id. at 39–40; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(g)(6). 
 60. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B. 
 61. 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2) (2012). 
 62. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 14–15. 
 63. Id. at 40 (“The Preamble to the Constitution proclaims that the people of the United 
States ordained and established that charter of government in part to ‘provide for the common 
defense.’ . . .  We hold that, in regulating the particular forms of support that plaintiffs seek to 
provide to foreign terrorist organizations, Congress has pursued that objective consistent with 
the limitations of the First and Fifth Amendments.”). 
 64. Id. at 26. 
 65. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 159–60 (1963) (holding that the Fifth 
and Sixth Amendments applied to cases involving forfeiture of U.S. citizenship); Terminiello 
v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 5, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (dissenting from an opinion in 
which the majority held unconstitutional an ordinance that criminalized speech that “stirred 
people to anger, invited public dispute, or brought about a condition of unrest”). 
616 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
protect those who cooperated in the dissemination of foreign terrorists’ 
materials.  A disturbingly high number of parties spread and learn terrorism 
on the internet.  Social media companies have provided them with the means 
of accessing recruits and coordinating with existing members.  They rely on 
social media companies to disseminate their calls to arms.  To avoid liability, 
it is logical to argue that Congress’s compelling purpose to advance public 
safety includes demanding of persons aware they are disseminating foreign 
terrorists’ messages to suspend or eliminate the materials. 
It is one thing when virtually independent parties use Twitter accounts or 
Facebook pages to articulate offensive or noxious ideas and a very different 
matter when those who post are coordinating with organizations like ISIS, 
Hezbollah, Hamas, or Al Qaeda in an effort to invigorate and instruct persons 
to act on ideologically violent teachings.  These are organizations that 
conspire with supporters to imperil innocents.  When this activity becomes 
known to the digital intermediary, recalcitrant failure to take it down and 
report it to the proper law enforcement authorities entangles internet 
platforms with the terrorist activities.66  Prohibiting internet information 
providers from knowingly publishing terrorist information and advocacy 
arises from “sensitive and weighty interests of national security and foreign 
affairs.”67  The compelling public interest in preventing mass casualties from 
terrorist attacks can be furthered by enforcing a narrowly tailored law against 
knowingly disseminating terrorist content through social media websites. 
III.  SOCIAL MEDIA LIABILITY 
Enforcement of the material-support statute is likely to be the most 
efficient and effective way of combating terrorist incitement and recruitment 
on digital platforms.  Social media companies have already taken some 
actions to combat online terrorist communications.  For example, Facebook, 
Twitter, YouTube, and Microsoft established a jointly shared database of 
terrorist images.68  This agreement will enable each company to be more 
aware of the digital materials that other platforms have identified to be 
extremist communications.  While a positive step for diminishing terrorist 
influences on the internet, the method is woefully deficient because it does 
not require any of the platforms to take down offending images; indeed, each 
 
 66. This argument is informed, albeit not governed, by the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act’s safe harbor protection. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A) (2012) (immunizing service 
providers from liability only if the service provider:  “(i) does not have actual knowledge that 
the material or an activity using the material on the system or network is infringing; (ii) in the 
absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or circumstances from which 
infringing activity is apparent; or (iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts 
expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material”).  While this statute deals with 
copyright violations, and is therefore not precisely on point with the material-support statute, 
the safe harbor’s actual knowledge standard readily lends itself to digital material support for 
terror prosecutions. 
 67. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 33–34. 
 68. James Titcomb, Facebook, Twitter and YouTube Create Database of Terrorist Images 
to Fight Online Extremism, TELEGRAPH (Dec. 5, 2016, 11:01 PM), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2016/12/05/facebook-twitter-youtube-create-
database-terrorist-images-fight/ [https://perma.cc/QP8K-UQN9]. 
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of them has varying standards of community decency, and they might not 
even agree on what constitutes incitement, offense, or recruitment.69  Federal 
law should create a uniform national mandate for public safety and security, 
rather than relying on corporate policies or disparate states’ standards and 
law enforcement departments. 
Pursuing litigation is strategically appropriate because social media 
providers have refused to take down many overtly terrorist posts on their 
own.70  Ultimately, judges should protect constitutional rights of free speech, 
while recognizing congressional authority to enforce the Preamble of the 
Constitution’s mandate to safeguard public safety.71  Incitement published 
on U.S. social media poses significant dangers.  Its impact is global.  The 
French interior minister recently asserted that 90 percent of people who are 
recruited to terrorism are indoctrinated through internet content.72 
Testimony before Congress in 2015 indicated that ISIS had over 46,000 
Twitter accounts and that its followers sent between 90,000 and 200,000 
tweets per day.73  In addition, Twitter hashtags have included “#slaughter of 
Jews,”74 and a Texas preschool teacher took to Twitter to insist on the need 
to “kill some Jews.”75  Other tweets encourage violence:  “Kill jews.  Kill all 
of them,” “Happy international stab a Jew day,” and “Stab Jews and have a 
juice.”76  Among the many other tweets calling for violence were those of a 
Syrian jihadist under his own name, Abu Khalid al-Amriki, “We love death 
 
 69. Id. 
 70. See supra Part I. 
 71. U.S. CONST. pmbl.  The Supreme Court has recognized that the Preamble to the 
Constitution contains a national mandate to secure the public defense. Humanitarian Law 
Project, 561 U.S. at 40. 
 72. Frédéric Donck, Digital Single Market, ISOC EUR. REGIONAL BUREAU NEWSL. 
(Internet Soc’y, Geneva, Switz.), Feb. 23, 2015, at 3. 
 73. ISIL in America:  Domestic Terror and Radicalization:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Sec., & Investigations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
114th Cong. 3 (Feb. 26, 2015) (asserting that there are 90,000 ISIS-related tweets per day); 
161 CONG. REC. H9316 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 2015) (statement of Rep. Ros-Lehtinen) (asserting 
that there are 200,000 ISIS-related tweets per day); J.M. Berger, Can We Win the War Against 
ISIS by Focusing on Social Media?, HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jm-
berger/isis-social-media_b_6733206.html [https://perma.cc/4VP9-YCQH] (last visited Oct. 
16, 2017). 
 74. Eliezer Sherman, Report:  Palestinian Stabbing Attacks Inspiring ISIS Supporters to 
Offer Guidance, ALGEMEINER (Oct. 14, 2015, 1:13 PM), https://www.algemeiner.com/2015/ 
10/14/report-palestinian-stabbing-attacks-inspiring-isis-supporters-to-offer-guidance/ 
[https://perma.cc/BUR4-BAJ4]; Slaughter the Jew, DIGITAL TERRORISM & HATE 2017, 
http://digitalhate.net/inicio.php [https://perma.cc/MB6D-DW7Y] (search the search field for 
“slaughter the Jew”). 
 75. ‘Kill Some Jews’ Tweet Gets Texas Pre-School Teacher Fired, FOX NEWS (Feb. 22, 
2017), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2017/02/22/kill-some-jews-tweet-gets-texas-pre-school-
teacher-suspended.html [https://perma.cc/E38U-4HFB].  The teacher seems to have disabled 
her own Twitter account after the news media exposed her post. Lea Speyer, Texas Pre-School 
Teacher Removed from Classroom After Twitter Calls to ‘Kill Some Jews’ Comes to Light, 
ALGEMEINER (Feb. 21, 2017, 3:59 PM), https://www.algemeiner.com/2017/02/21/texas-pre-
school-teacher-removed-from-classroom-after-twitter-calls-to-kill-some-jews-come-to-light/ 
[https://perma.cc/5A9P-X5EU]. 
 76. Anti-Defamation League, Incitement to Violence Against Jews Spreads Online, ADL 
BLOG (Oct. 9, 2015), https://www.adl.org/blog/incitement-to-violence-against-jews-spreads-
online [https://perma.cc/KX25-N9RW]. 
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more than you love life.  We love Prophet Muhammad . . . more than we love 
our own selves.  Kill those that insult the Prophet.”77  Using another Twitter 
account, Jihadi John, an infamous ISIS executioner, tweeted admonitions to 
emulate previous terrorist attackers like Mohamed Atta (the leading figure of 
the World Trade Center attacks on September 11, 2001) as well as Dzhokhar 
and Tamerlan Tsarnaev (the Boston Marathon bombers).78  These were 
overtly violent and inciteful.  Investing more to improve algorithmic 
software, developed to classify syntactic and semantic strings of violent 
terrorist messages, could have enabled Twitter to quickly eliminate these 
hostile expressions.79 
Federal enforcement of the material-support statute against social media 
organizations is likely to incentivize them to allocate additional capital to 
develop software that, at a minimum, can detect overtly violent incitement.  
But the public’s need for national security must be balanced against 
legitimate concerns for personal autonomy and privacy.  The information, 
coupled with data collection, unmasks IP addresses of designated terror 
organizations and uses fingerprinting technologies to recognize the pictorial 
pixels of previously identified terrorist organizations’ digital imagery.80  
Such information will facilitate social media vigilance, but to avoid 
violations of civil liberties, law should provide for (1) proprietary data 
security; (2) procedural transparency into investigations, except in matters of 
national emergency, allowing social media companies to challenge 
government demands for information; and (3) procedural safeguards both for 
ongoing and emergency investigations.  Critical to the protection of privacy 
is the enforcement of an independent judicial authority to review law 
enforcement demands for customer data. 
In addition to Twitter, ISIS and other designated terrorist organizations 
rely on a variety of other digital platforms, including Facebook, Kik, 
WhatsApp, YouTube, and Ask.FM.81  YouTube is one of the most effective 
tools for terrorist recruitment. 
 
 77. Daniel Greenfield, ISIS Jihadists Threaten Frontpage Mag, FRONTPAGE MAG (May 4, 
2015), http://www.frontpagemag.com/point/256365/isis-jihadists-threaten-frontpagemag-
daniel-greenfield [https://perma.cc/J5P4-7PYK]. 
 78. Jihadi John, DIGITAL TERRORISM & HATE 2017, http://digitalhate.net/inicio.php# 
[https://perma.cc/MB6D-DW7Y] (search the search field for “jihadi john”). 
 79. Scholars have performed several studies on data mining and algorithmic frameworks 
for identifying terrorist and otherwise hostile messaging on social media. See generally Pete 
Burnap & Matthew L. Williams, Cyber Hate Speech on Twitter:  An Application of Machine 
Classification and Statistical Modeling for Policy and Decision Making, 7 POL’Y & INTERNET 
223 (2015); Marc Cheong & Vincent C. S. Lee, A Microblogging-Based Approach to 
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Terrorism Events via Twitter, 13 INFO. SYSTEMS FRONTIERS 45 (2011); Ellen Spertus, Smokey:  
Automatic Recognition of Hostile Messages, 1997 IAAI PROC. 1058. 
 80. Adam Tanner, The Web Cookie Is Dying. Here’s the Creepier Technology That Comes 
Next, FORBES (June 17, 2013, 12:29 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/adamtanner/2013/06/ 
17/the-web-cookie-is-dying-heres-the-creepier-technology-that-comes-next/ 
[https://perma.cc/62F6-FZ2F]. 
 81. ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, RESPONDING TO CYBERHATE:  PROGRESS AND TRENDS 9–
10 (2016). 
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A video that has since been removed from YouTube spelled out “44 way 
[sic] to support jihad Shaikh Tamim Al Adnani,” and contained gruesome 
imagery with a running ticker encouraging viewers to send financial 
contributions, disseminate jihad, engage in arms training, and translate jihadi 
literature.82  As on other social media websites, Facebook accounts that 
advocate on behalf of terrorists are sometimes briefly removed only to 
reappear again under a different moniker, as was the case with Abu 
Haleema’s account, which advocated for violence and intolerance.83  
Facebook likewise took down Hamas’s glorifications of a terrorist bomb-
maker but, for a time, left untouched a Palestinian authority’s Facebook 
lionization of the same “engineer” and its exhortation calling on others to 
follow his martyrdom.84 
While social media companies have independently worked to eliminate 
many terrorist postings, they are too often recalcitrant, tardy, or 
uncooperative in responding to law enforcement agencies’ or public 
watchdogs’ requests for removal of designated terrorists’ web postings.85  To 
date, the federal government has been hesitant to enforce the material-support 
statute against social media companies.  The Constitution limits the power of 
government to intrude on these companies’ speech rights to eschew the 
official censorship of debates, even when they involve obnoxious and 
offensive statements.  The First Amendment even protects expressions of 
violent political philosophy or religious doctrine.86  Individual liability arises 
when a party issues a true threat87 or cooperates with a foreign terrorist 
organization.88  Social content providers have no legal obligation to remove 
abstract statements that favor terrorist groups but neither advocate violence 
against anyone nor support terrorist organizers.89  However, a social media 
 
 82. This video was previously available at Mohd Zhukrie bin Nawang, 44 Way to Support 
Jihad Shaikh Tamim Al Adnani, YOUTUBE (July 22, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/ 
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 83. Daniel Peters et al., Extremist London Preacher Who ‘Giggled’ at an ISIS Beheading 
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Trust (Feb. 16, 2016), https://jantrust.wordpress.com/2016/02/16/are-social-media-companies 
-doing-enough-to-combat-internet-extremism/ [https://perma.cc/P95Z-CLDR]. 
 86. See Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 229 (1961) (“[The Free Speech Clause] 
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States, 367 U.S. 290, 299 (1961))). 
 87. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359–60 (2003). 
 88. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 36–38 (2010). 
 89. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).  Indeed, several 
terrorist social media sites are purportedly used by national intelligence organizations for 
clandestine espionage. See Roi Kais, Hezbollah’s Battle Against Mysterious ‘Zionist’ 
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company that is made aware that a foreign terrorist organization has uploaded 
materials on its platform should be legally obligated to remove it, report it to 
law enforcement authorities, and share the information with other internet 
information providers.  They also should be held criminally liable to 
communicate the gravity of helping terrorists advance their machinations. 
The companies will want to keep proprietary information confidential, but 
profit motive and corporate efficiency are not important enough interests to 
gainsay the compelling government interest to enforce laws narrowly tailored 
to secure public safety.  There is no First Amendment right to be a venue for 
terrorist propaganda, indoctrination, threats, recruitment videos, or weapons-
making instructions.  Communications platforms, such as YouTube, should 
enjoy no immunity for knowingly hosting operational contents for groups 
bent on mass murder and havoc such as Al Qaeda or ISIS. 
True threats and material support of terrorist organizations are unprotected 
forms of speech because they raise grave safety concerns.  In circumstances 
where the internet information provider is unaware of the posting, it cannot 
be held accountable.  However, where it is made aware by law enforcement 
agents or private citizens, the entity is on notice that indifference, 
intransigence, or other lack of effort to investigate and take down the 
offending material can subject it to criminal liability.  Under those 
circumstances, a social media provider should be required to take affirmative 
steps both to remove the offending materials and to develop software 
designed to prevent terrorist organizations from reappearing under different 
accounts.  Identifying the initiators of the postings can be done through 
simple ISP identification, which tracks the activities of a specific computer 
account, and through sophisticated, semantic algorithms or fingerprinting 
technologies. 
A.  Civil Liability 
A party seeking to establish civil liability against a social media outlet 
would face an uphill battle.  The outcome of private litigation, filed pursuant 
to the civil remedy provision of the Anti-Terrorism Act,90 is far from certain.  
This avenue of redress nevertheless warrants analysis. 
A civil lawsuit might be brought against a social media company that 
knowingly cooperates with designated foreign terrorists in posting, 
displaying, or housing propaganda.91  Scienter may be satisfied when an 
entity recognizes it is supporting a terrorist organization; it need not be aware 
that its aid is going to advance a specific terrorist conspiracy.92  Secondary 
liability against entities operating in the United States would increase the 
 
Campaign, YNETNEWS.COM (Apr. 13, 2017, 1:27 PM), http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/ 
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 90. 18 U.S.C. § 2333 (2012). 
 91. Cf. Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst. & Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 291 F.3d 
1000, 1028 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that secondary liability is available under the Anti-
Terrorism Act for knowing financial support of foreign terrorist organizations). 
 92. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 16–18. 
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likelihood of collecting judgments, since many terrorists and their sources of 
capital are outside the country.93 
Mainstream social media companies do not create terrorist statements.  
However, the companies often allow terrorists and terrorist organizations to 
use their platforms for disseminating terrorist propaganda.  Taking a purely 
textualist approach to statutory interpretation, the language of the statute 
appears to permit victims of terrorism or their survivors to file lawsuits 
against social media companies only in a narrow set of circumstances.94  The 
statute specifically permits suits to be brought against a person or entity that 
allegedly “aids and abets, by knowingly providing substantial assistance” to 
a “person who committed such an act of international terrorism.”95  Under 
this statutory provision, liability could only be found if the digital information 
company “authorized” the designated terrorist organization to commit, plan, 
or provide substantial assistance to international terrorist organizations to 
commit those acts.96  Arguably, knowing authorization may include granting 
a designated terrorist organization the right to maintain a digital social media 
account. 
The statute does not countenance courts, legislators, or administrators 
subjectively deciding what association qualifies as a terrorist organization.  
The Immigration and Nationality Act does not leave the definition of a 
terrorist organization ambiguous;97 rather, it requires the Department of State 
to engage in nonarbitrary administrative hearings before designating an 
association a foreign terrorist organization.98  Terrorist organizations engage 
in atrocities, such as hijacking vehicles; seizing and detaining persons; 
“threatening to kill, injure, or continue to detain, another individual in order 
to compel a third person (including a governmental organization) to do or 
abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release 
of the individual seized or detained”; engaging in assassination; using 
biological, chemical, or nuclear agents; and similarly egregious 
misconduct.99 
Despite the availability of treble damages under the Anti-Terrorism Act,100 
there is a significant hurdle to success in seeking to hold social media 
information companies accountable.  Since 1997, federal courts have 
developed a doctrine of immunity that protects computer content 
disseminators from civil liability.  The pertinent statute, § 230 of the CDA, 
grants immunity to “provider[s] or user[s] of an interactive computer service” 
from being held responsible for content created by a third party.101  Courts 
have extended application of this language to digital information distributors 
even when they have notice and have been made aware that they are hosting 
 
 93. Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 549 F.3d 685, 690 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 94. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2333(a) (Westlaw 2016). 
 95. Id. § 2333(d)(2). 
 96. Id. 
 97. 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (2012). 
 98. Id. § 1189(c). 
 99. Id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii). 
 100. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2333(a). 
 101. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (2012). 
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defamatory content on their internet platforms.102  Courts have interpreted 
§ 230 to apply to internet intermediaries that host third-party content.  There 
is a general consensus among judges that Congress intended digital platforms 
to be immune, expecting thereby to promote a robust market for free speech 
and to sanction internet intermediaries to selectively police websites for 
offensive content.103  The law passed in response to a state court’s holding 
that internet companies were subject to defamation suits simply for 
exercising editorial control.104  With the passage of § 230(c)(2), Congress 
undertook to protect internet information providers who in good faith screen, 
remove, or block materials they believe to be “excessively violent . . . or 
otherwise objectionable.”105  The judicial consensus holds that, subsequent 
to the enactment of § 230, information service companies can no longer be 
held accountable when they function as neutral conduits for information or 
selectively remove content.106 
Circuit courts throughout the country have deferred to Congress’s reliance 
on corporate responsibility to uphold the rationale for § 230 immunity,107 
which they believe incentivizes companies like Yahoo!, Twitter, and 
Facebook to take independent actions to monitor their services to prevent the 
posting and retention of terrorist messages.  However, there is reason to doubt 
this accepted interpretation of § 230.  Some scholars have argued that these 
internet information providers are distributors that do not qualify for § 230 
publisher immunity.108  Because social media companies are more involved 
 
 102. Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 420 (1st Cir. 2007) 
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own speech”); see also Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331–34 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 103. The statute creates the following treatment of any “publisher or speaker”:  “No 
provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker 
of any information provided by another information content provider.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1); 
see also Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330 (interpreting § 230); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Thinking in the 
Box in Legal Scholarship:  The Good Samaritan and Internet Libel, 66 J. LEGAL ED. 55, 59–
60 (2016) (discussing statutory interpretation of § 230). 
 104. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 031063-94, 1995 WL 323710, at 
*6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995). 
 105. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331 (“Congress enacted § 230 to remove the disincentives to 
selfregulation created by the Stratton Oakmont decision.”).  Section 230(c)(2)(A) reads: 
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on account 
of any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of 
material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, 
excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such 
material is constitutionally protected. 
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A). 
 106. See, e.g., Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1358 (D.C. Cir. 2014); FTC v. 
Accusearch Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1199–1200 (10th Cir. 2009); Jurin v. Google Inc., 695 F. 
Supp. 2d 1117, 1122–23 (E.D. Cal. 2010); Goddard v. Google, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 
1197–98 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 
 107. See Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1020 (9th Cir. 2003); Green v. Am. Online, Inc., 
318 F.3d 465, 470 (3d Cir. 2003); Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. Am. Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 
980, 986 (10th Cir. 2000). 
 108. Susan Freiwald, Comparative Institutional Analysis in Cyberspace:  The Case of 
Intermediary Liability for Defamation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 569, 637–42 (2001); Sewali K. 
Patel, Note, Immunizing Internet Service Providers from Third-Party Internet Defamation 
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in the selection of disseminated information than traditional publishers, they 
do not qualify for the CDA’s immunity provision.109 
Once the internet information company is informed that there is illegal 
content on its websites—such as material support of terror—it no longer 
functions simply as a passive conduit for information.  Indeed, the extent of 
immunity has been severally parsed by differing federal courts of appeals.  
An early case, Zeran v. America Online, Inc.,110 held that § 230 creates 
blanket immunity from liability.111  However, a more recent case from a 
different federal circuit, Chicago Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under 
Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc.,112 questioned the court’s finding in Zeran of 
“broad immunity from liability for unlawful third-party content.”113  In 
Chicago Lawyers’, the court pointed out that internet information providers 
are not immune from liability arising from participation or encouragement of 
illegal activity, such as copyright infringement.114  One can extrapolate from 
the latter holding that any computer service engaged in terrorist recruitment 
would not be protected under § 230.  But this has no application to Twitter, 
Google, and Facebook, which post no terrorist materials of their own.  
Indeed, they eliminate many third-party posts containing such content.  
Nevertheless, those companies have not done enough to mitigate damages 
from terrorists who exploit their services to incite and propagandize.115  For 
the time being, § 230 immunity is deeply entrenched in most circuits that 
have addressed the topic.  The law is unlikely to change without 
congressional revision of the statute. 
That is not, however, to say that civil liability is entirely precluded.  
Benjamin Wittes and Zoe Bedell proffer a suggestion that even taking for 
granted civil immunity in ordinary tort cases, social media companies that 
violate the material-support statute should not be similarly immune.116  They 
argue that social information websites, such as Twitter, that host terrorists’ 
posts are not immune from liability because § 230(e)(1) contains an 
exception:  “Nothing in this section shall be construed to impair the 
 
Claims:  How Far Should Courts Go?, 55 VAND. L. REV. 647, 651–53 (2002).  The Center for 
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 109. Patel, supra note 108, at 680–83. 
 110. 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 111. Id. at 330 (“By its plain language, § 230 creates a federal immunity to any cause of 
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 115. See supra Part I. 
 116. See Benjamin Wittes & Zoe Bedell, Did Congress Immunize Twitter Against Lawsuits 
for Supporting ISIS?, LAWFARE (Jan. 22, 2016, 9:14 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/did-
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enforcement of . . . any . . . Federal criminal statute.”117  Wittes and Bedell’s 
insightful observation does not, however, fully resolve the matter because it 
is likely that a digital media platform would claim immunity by arguing that 
it had not engaged in material support of terrorist organizations, even when 
it carries terrorist content that a third party created and posted on its platform.  
In anticipation of this defense, complainants would significantly increase 
their chances of success by delaying the filing of a civil suit until after the 
prospective defendant’s criminal conviction for material support.118  Put in 
more technical terms, civil material-support litigation119 should follow on the 
heels of criminal material-support conviction.120 
A civil litigant would also need to prove causation.  A proper party plaintiff 
would need to demonstrate that he or she suffered harm that was actually and 
proximately caused by the digital information provider’s material support of 
a foreign terrorist organization.121  In addition to proving that a company 
knew it was profiting from hosting the violent entity on its platform, a 
complainant would need to demonstrate that the posted material advanced a 
designated terrorist organization’s agenda.122  Litigants would need to gather 
evidence demonstrating that they suffered actual harm from the internet 
information service’s decision to ignore complaints about the posting of 
foreign terrorist materials on its website.123 
The case could be built on evidence that would include a record of 
complaints the company had received about specific webpages, videos, posts, 
articles, IP addresses, or accounts of foreign terrorist organizations; the 
company’s failure to remove the material; a terrorist’s subsequent viewing of 
or interacting with the material on the website; and that terrorist’s acting upon 
the propaganda to harm the plaintiff.  Such a lawsuit likely would be difficult 
to win, but success would not be precluded because § 230(e)(1) provides that 
information providers are not exempt from culpability for criminal activity, 
including the material support of terrorism.124 
Given the current judicial trend finding digital information intermediaries 
to enjoy civil immunity, Congress should consider advancing new legislation 
to clarify that § 230 does not apply to litigation seeking a remedy against data 
that are materially supportive of foreign terrorist organizations.  The terms of 
immunity so tie the hands of litigants that some modification of the statute is 
in order.  The safe harbor provision might be reenacted to include a provision 
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that explicitly excludes from coverage organizations and individuals who 
pose national security risks.  That does not get around the need to prove 
causation; therefore, the likelihood of success at the motion to dismiss, 
summary judgment, or merits phases of litigation remains small.  However, 
where Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, and similar content carriers receive 
notice of terrorist statements that harmed or are likely to result in attacks 
against a party, a court should find standing for a plaintiff to proceed with a 
civil suit for compensatory, injunctive, or punitive relief. 
B.  Criminal Liability 
Social media services have expanded the expressive reach of terrorists by 
providing them with outlets for mobilizing individual attacks by “lone 
wolves,” many of whose first contacts with these organizations were through 
the internet.125  Civil remedies are difficult to obtain against social media 
companies.126  A strategy more likely to succeed would be for the Justice 
Department to file criminal complaints against companies for violating the 
true-threats statute127 or material-support statute.128  Criminal liability could 
include monetary fines, orders for internet information providers to maintain 
records of IP addresses and contents found on foreign terrorist webpages, and 
takedown orders.  In addition, culpable companies could be enjoined to create 
hyperlinks on suspect pages, enabling users to directly inform appropriate 
national intelligence agencies of suspicious materials. 
Administrative agencies, to be on the front lines of fair and thorough 
investigations, will also need to promulgate new regulations.  The terms of 
regulation should be attentive to the doctrinal balance between the often 
conflicting compelling interests of national security and free expression.  
This will require enforcement of narrowly tailored rules that will not limit 
more speech than necessary for national security.  These regulations should 
be passed only after extensive hearings and studies about effective methods 
of enforcing the material-support law against recalcitrant social media 
companies.  The public agency in charge of the program will need 
investigative powers to gather pertinent data.  Mechanisms will also need to 
be created that can enable administrators to take emergency measures, while 
simultaneously preserving the due process rights of internet intermediaries to 
challenge orders to immediately block, temporarily remove, or permanently 
destroy data. 
Relying on the material-support statute or true-threats statutes could 
effectively prevent abusive government censorship.  Of course, there is a risk 
of law enforcement overreaching, but the same can be said about almost any 
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criminal law.  Nevertheless, social media organizations cannot be held 
accountable for anything a private complainant or law enforcement agency 
regards to be offensive.  Criminal charges can be brought when an internet 
information provider refuses to comply with a federal agency request to take 
down the threatening or inciteful content that a designated terrorist 
organization placed on its server.  They can also be brought for failure to 
remove direct and intentional targeting of threats against individuals.  If any 
charges are filed, a party must be afforded notice, an opportunity to be heard, 
and judicial relief against arbitrary state encroachment on the company’s 
legitimate speech interests. 
Some litigation will no doubt involve evidence directly impacting national 
security.  In those circumstances, government should nevertheless provide a 
defendant with adequate access to documentation, affidavits, and physical 
objects to mount a defense.  An in camera hearing might be required for the 
government to divulge particularly sensitive information to a judge, in which 
case, the defense attorney would need to have an appropriate level of security 
clearance.129  Furthermore, because speech is of such importance to 
deliberative democracy, requiring plaintiffs to pay attorneys costs to social 
media companies that mount successful challenges would be a deterrent 
against groundless litigation. 
In addition to takedown orders against terrorist digital accounts—which 
might later crop up under new hashtags, html addresses, or profiles—a court 
might also issue an injunction to develop or deploy algorithmic software for 
identifying offending sites used to overtly incite audiences to commit acts of 
violence or to provide material support in the recruitment or 
operationalization of terror.130  This mechanical fix would diminish, though 
it would not entirely eliminate, the sheer number of terrorist materials that 
are regularly transmitted through websites like Twitter. 
Currently, ISIS and other terrorist organizations rely extensively on 
Twitter.131  The company only selectively culls terroristic texts, in part 
because its employees may not be able to distinguish between the promotion 
of terrorism and political advocacy.132  Terrorists exploit the company’s 
liberality.  Twitter remains a platform for propagandizing, inciting, and 
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spreading operational instructions.133  Terrorists exploit U.S. companies’ 
seeming naiveté about the ability of terrorists to advance their recruitment 
and violent objectives by communicating through digital networks.  Where 
there is a compelling state interest in public safety, courts should be granted 
authority to issue warrants requiring companies to reveal identifying 
information concerning foreign terrorists’ accounts. 
The Supreme Court has set several significant barriers to prevent the 
government from abusing the material-support statute for arbitrary 
censorship.  One such barrier is judicial review.  In Humanitarian Law 
Project, the Court held that Congress has the authority to rely on expert 
evidence to identify “particularly dangerous and lawless foreign 
organizations.”134  The secretary of state can only place a group on the list of 
designated terrorist organizations after extensive evidence gathering reveals 
the group to have a history of ideologically driven violent activities, such as 
killings and bombings.135  Federal law also requires the Department of State 
to evaluate whether designating an entity a terrorist association will have 
consequences on “national defense, foreign relations, or economic 
interests.”136 
Furthermore, the secretary must notify suspected groups and offer them 
opportunities to rebut findings, with the caveat that they will have only 
limited access to classified documents.137  The law thereby creates “stringent 
requirements” for designating a group a foreign terrorist organization.138  The 
First Amendment should not protect social media information providers who 
materially support groups that, after extensive intelligence gathering and 
opportunity to be heard, were designated as foreign terror organizations.  To 
date, social media organizations provide designated terrorist entities with 
platforms for propaganda, indoctrination, and recruitment materials that 
influence susceptible persons to engage in violent and ideological schemes. 
However post hoc complaints would fare, it is clear that the government is 
prohibited from imposing prior restraints on speech, except in cases of 
national emergency.139  This is especially the case when the government 
relies on an act of Congress, such as the material-support or true-threats 
statutes, to advance national security interests.140  In the case of a pressing 
and clearly defined national emergency, narrowly tailored restrictions prior 
to publication may be constitutionally permissible. 
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To effectuate its investigation, the government may issue national security 
letters (NSLs) to identify terrorists’ IP addresses and similar information 
known only to the internet information companies.  NSLs do not require prior 
judicial proceedings and can be kept confidential throughout the 
investigation.141  Companies unwilling to comply are granted the right of 
judicial review.142 
It is important to stress that there is a strong presumption against prior 
restraints on speech; therefore, except in rare cases of immediate national 
emergencies,143 the government should only pursue internet service 
companies that have intentionally cooperated with a designated terrorist 
organization to upload or maintain digital accounts.  Indeed, the NSL system 
has a variety of components that raise some serious concerns, including a 
lack of constitutional protections prior to the initiation of an investigation and 
lack of public oversight.  This Article has, however, focused on the cases 
where investigators only need to use ordinary searches, rather than intrusive 
surveillance, to investigate and file charges requesting takedown orders, 
injunctions, and damages.  Criminal law should focus on publicly available 
digital materials and therefore existing expressive conduct, which raises no 
prior restraint issues. 
C.  International Guidelines 
In drafting a material-support statute providing specific due process rights 
and remedies in material-support criminal actions brought against social 
media intermediaries, Congress should not act in a vacuum.  Rather, it should 
look to international legislative models.  Canada is an example of an open 
and vibrant democracy that empowers courts to order removal of electronic 
copies of hate propaganda that are maintained on computer systems located 
within the country’s jurisdiction.144  The Canadian criminal code grants 
judges the power to 
order the custodian of the computer system to (a) give an electronic copy 
of the material to the court; (b) ensure that the material is no longer stored 
on and made available through the computer system; and (c) provide the 
information necessary to identify and locate the person who posted the 
material.145 
Like the United States, Canada places great emphasis on the importance of 
free speech to a democracy.  Nevertheless, restrictions on hate speech, such 
as the online support of terrorism, go hand-in-hand with the nation’s 
guarantee of free expression in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
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The country’s supreme court recognizes three principal values associated 
with the constitutional guarantee of free expression:  the quest for truth, the 
pursuit of “social and political decision-making,” and the individual’s desire 
to enjoy “self-fulfillment and human flourishing.”146  Canada does not, 
however, maintain a libertarian regime; it instead acknowledges that 
“reasonable limits prescribed by law” are conducive for safeguarding “a free 
and democratic society.”147  The centrality of free speech to Canadian 
pluralistic society does not countenance the electronic dissemination of 
terrorist materials through computer systems.148 
The Canadian Anti-Terrorism Act grants courts additional power to 
identify terrorist propaganda on computer systems that are available to the 
public.149  Judges can order a “computer system’s custodian to delete the 
material.”150  Prior to the deletion, a court must provide notice and an 
opportunity to be heard in court to the party who posted the materials.  Or, if 
that party cannot be located or is outside Canada, a judge can order the 
computer system’s custodian to post a notice of removal in the digital space 
where the document had previously been available.151 
Materials containing hate propaganda are unprotected.152  Canada clearly 
distinguishes constitutionally protected free speech from terrorist and hate 
propaganda.  Terrorist ideology is not a form of deliberation but a strategic 
means of recruitment, organization, planning, misinformation, antagonism, 
and threat.153  Nor does Canada recognize the promotion of terrorism to be 
protected by its constitutional guarantee of free association.154 
A digital intermediary is unlikely to be liable for “innocent dissemination” 
of terrorist information.  This Article extrapolates this premise from 
Canadian defamation law, which exonerates a party who facilitates the 
circulation of false and harmful information without “actual knowledge” of 
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the content.155  Using this analogous model of liability, a social media 
company might argue in defense that it had “no actual knowledge” that would 
put it “on notice to suspect” the existence of terrorist incitement on its 
server.156  Speech is of such great constitutional importance that computer 
intermediaries are likely protected against liability for unknowingly and 
unintentionally hosting terrorist hyperlinks and other materials posted by 
third parties. 
The European Union has likewise recognized the dangers of terrorist 
groups’ propaganda on social media.  The EU’s official statement warns that 
terrorist organizations exploit social media to recruit, radicalize, and instruct 
their supporters.157  The European Convention on the Prevention of 
Terrorism requires the forty-seven member states of the Council of Europe 
to criminalize the “public provocation to commit a terrorist offence.”158  The 
Convention prohibits the “distribution, or otherwise making available, of a 
message to the public, with the intent to incite the commission of a terrorist 
offense, where such conduct, whether or not directly advocating terrorist 
offences, causes a danger that one or more such offences may be 
committed.”159 
Article 5 of the Convention is consistent with the U.S. material-support 
doctrine as both criminalize only intentional utterances that are directed at 
the public.160  This is not to say that Article 5 is entirely consistent with U.S. 
free speech doctrine.  In addition to true threats, the Convention also obligates 
members of the EU to criminalize apologetics of terrorism, which is also 
called the “glorification” of terrorism.161  The European provision goes 
beyond true threats, recognizing that public praise, support, and justification 
of terrorism also pose a danger to public order.162  Humanitarian Law Project 
does not recognize statements supporting, praising, or glorifying terror to be 
per se actionable offenses.163  This distinction means that judges should not 
blindly follow European precedents interpreting the Convention but should 
use them as advisory opinions. 
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CONCLUSION 
Various terrorist organizations rely on social media platforms to threaten, 
incite, propagandize, and recruit.  Internet information companies are often 
reluctant or ambivalent about removing even explicit and graphic calls for 
ideologically motivated carnage, disruption, destruction, and terrorist 
indoctrination.  Those companies are not purveyors of threats or incitement.  
Their responsibility arises, nevertheless, when they cooperate with terrorist 
organizations by purposefully, knowingly, or recklessly providing a platform 
for their indoctrinating, threatening, or instructive content.  In doing so, 
internet services can run afoul of the material-support statute.  Self-policing 
has proven too ineffective a means for preventing the harms social media 
companies have created by offering terrorists digital platforms.  Concerted 
government action by means of criminal prosecutions and injunctions is 
needed to maintain a national standard against the material support of 
designated terrorist organizations. 
